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SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO HOLDS THAT AN EXCESS INSURER WHO
ENDORSES A PRIMARY INSURER’S COVERAGE AGREEMENT BY FOLLOW-FORM IS
SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRAL CLAUSE WITHIN THAT AGREEMENT
By
Jamie L. Augustinsky*
I.

INTRODUCTION
In Radil v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of

Colorado held that an excess insurer was bound by the arbitration clause in the
primary insurer’s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage when the excess
insurer endorsed the primary insurer’s coverage by follow-form.1 The court
reasoned that since the excess insurer did not provide any limiting language
concerning the scope of the coverage, the follow-form endorsement applied to the
entire scope of the primary insurer’s coverage, including the arbitral clause.2
Further, the court rejected the excess insurer’s argument that a boilerplate
statement found at the end of the policy agreement constituted an express
disclaimer of the arbitration clause.3 The court cited Colorado’s strong public
policy in favor of arbitration as a mechanism of alternate dispute resolution to
support its holding.4
II.

BACKGROUND
Jennifer Radil, Plaintiff, worked as a camp counselor for Sanborn Western

Camps (“the employer”).5 On July 10, 2000, the employer scheduled a counselor
appreciation day, which included a whitewater raft trip partially paid for by the
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employer.6 Because the employer’s vans were not available on that day, a
supervisor provided her sport utility vehicle to transport the counselors.7 The
supervisor’s daughter drove the vehicle.8 Because there were more passengers than
seats in the vehicle, Radil rode in the space behind the seats, which did not have
any passenger restraints.9 En route, the driver lost control of the vehicle and the
vehicle rolled, ejecting Radil and breaking her neck.10 Radil was seriously injured
and rendered a quadriplegic as a result of the accident.11
The driver of the vehicle was insured under her mother’s automobile
liability policy with a $500,000 limit.12 The employer’s primary automobile
insurance policy was with Great American Assurance Company (“Great
American”) and had a $1 million limit.13 The employer also held a commercial
umbrella policy issued by National Union Fire Insurance Company (“National
Union”), Defendant, with a $25 million limit.14 The Great American policy
provided uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage and contained
numerous terms and conditions defining the policy’s coverage.15 The Great
American policy included an arbitration clause, which provided that:
If we, and an “insured” disagree whether the “insured” is
legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or driver
of an “uninsured motor vehicle” or do not agree as to the
amount of damages that are recoverable by that “insured,”
then the matter may be arbitrated. However, disputes
6
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concerning coverage under this endorsement may not be
arbitrated. Either party may make a written demand for
arbitration.16
National Union’s umbrella policy contained a “follow-form endorsement” of Great
American’s UM/UIM coverage.17 This endorsement stated that:
This insurance shall not apply to: Any obligation of the
Insured under an “Uninsured Motorist” law. However, if a
policy listed in the Schedule of Underlying Insurance
provides this coverage:
1. this exclusion will not apply; and
2. the insurance provided by our policy will not be broader
than the insurance coverage listed in the Schedule of
Underlying Insurance.
All other terms and conditions of this policy remain unchanged.18
After being denied worker’s compensation benefits, Radil filed a personal
injury claim against the employer and the driver of the vehicle as a diversity action
in federal court.19 Meanwhile, Great American filed a declaratory judgment action
against the employer and Radil in state court to establish that it had no duty to
defend or indemnify the employer.20 The employer joined National Union as a
cross-claim defendant to Great American’s action.21 Radil subsequently filed a
cross-claim declaration against National Union, which stated that she was entitled
16

Radil, 233 P.3d at 690.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Radil, 233 P.3d at 690.
17

296

YEARBOOK ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION

to underinsured motorist benefits under the National Union policy.22 With National
Union’s consent, Radil settled her claims against the driver for $500,000 and
settled with the employer for the $1 million Great American policy limit in federal
court.23 Radil did, however, reserve her right to seek underinsured motorist
benefits from National Union.24 The employer and Great American then stipulated
to a dismissal of their claims in the state court action, leaving only Radil and
National Union as parties in this state court proceeding.25
Radil moved to either compel arbitration of her claims against National
Union, or to amend her cross-claim to include claims for underinsured motorist
benefits.26 National Union moved for summary judgment, claiming that it had no
obligation to pay underinsured motorist benefits to Radil.27 The trial court grant
National Union’s motion and denied Radil’s requests to either compel arbitration
or amend her cross-claim.28 On appeal, the court of appeals vacated the grant of
summary judgment to National Union and concluded that Radil was entitled to
underinsured motorist benefits under the National Union policy.29 On remand,
Radil again moved to either compel arbitration of her claims or amend her crossclaim.30 National Union argued that its follow-form endorsement did not
incorporate Great American’s arbitration clause.31 The trial court subsequently
found that a valid arbitration agreement did exist between Radil and National
Union and granted Radil’s motion to compel arbitration.32 In response to National
Union’s litigation-based waiver defense, the trial court determined that the arbitral
22

Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 691.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Radil, 233 P.3d at 691.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. (citing Radil v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co, 207 P.3d 849, 859 (Colo. App. 2008), cert.
denied).
30
Id.
31
Radil, 233 P.3d at 691.
32
Id.
23

COMMENTS ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION

297

panel, and not the court, was responsible for determining the validity of this
defense.33 National Union then petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado to issue
a rule to show cause why the trial court should not vacate its order.34
III.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

A.

National Union’s Follow-Form Endorsement Bound It to the Arbitral
Clause
The Supreme Court of Colorado first discussed the appropriate standard to

employ when reviewing a trial court’s order compelling arbitration. The court
stated that although a trial court’s order compelling arbitration is not immediately
appealable, the state Supreme Court could exercise its original jurisdiction to
review the order.35 The court further articulated that the existence and scope of an
arbitration agreement are questions of law that courts review de novo by applying
state contract law principles, resolving all ambiguities in favor of arbitration.36
The court then turned its discussion to the issue of whether National
Union’s follow-form endorsement incorporated the arbitration clause of Great
American’s UM/UIM endorsement. The court explained that Great American, as
the primary policy, included specific terms and conditions within its endorsement
that specifically described the scope of its coverage.37 Further, these terms and
conditions constituted the “form” of Great American’s coverage and were evidence
of the parties’ intention on the scope of the coverage.38 This coverage included an
arbitration clause that gave either party to the agreement the right to compel

33
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arbitration of disagreements concerning the entitlement to or amount of the
UM/UIM benefits.39
The court asserted that National Union’s follow-form endorsement of
Great American’s UM/UIM coverage did not provide any language describing the
specific coverage it endorsed.40 Because there was no express language limiting
National Union’s UM/UIM coverage, the follow-form endorsement incorporated
the entire form of Great American’s UM/UIM coverage.41 To hold otherwise in the
absence of any express limiting language would have left the parties guessing as to
what the coverage did and did not provide.42 Because the follow-form endorsement
required National Union to assume “any obligation of the Insured under an
‘Uninsured Motorist’ or ‘Underinsured Motorist’ law [where] a policy listed in the
Schedule of Underlying Insurance provides this coverage,” the court concluded
that the substance of National Union’s obligation was defined by the terms and
conditions found within Great American’s UM/UIM coverage.43 Further, the court
asserted that National Union could have explicitly rejected or modified the
arbitration clause upon issuance of the follow-form endorsement.44 Because it did
not, however, it could not attempt to avoid a particular term of the underlying
coverage when its endorsement followed the form of that coverage.45
The court next addressed and rejected National Union’s argument that the
statement “all other terms and conditions of this policy remain unchanged”
expressly disclaimed the arbitration clause.46 The court found that this statement
was a boilerplate statement that appeared at the end of each National Union
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endorsement, regardless of the specific content of each endorsement.47 Because
this statement was ambiguous, the court reasoned that it must construe the
statement in favor of arbitration.48 Accordingly, this ambiguous, boilerplate
statement found at the end of National Union’s endorsement did not expressly
disclaim the arbitration clause found within Great American’s UM/UIM coverage.
Because National Union endorsed the entirety of Great American’s
coverage form and did not expressly disclaim the reference to arbitration found
within that coverage, the court concluded that National Union was subject to
arbitration pursuant to the coverage form.
B.

The Trial Court Must Determine the Defense of Litigation-Based Waiver
National Union next argued that, even if it was bound by the arbitration

agreement, the trial court erred in its determination that the defense of litigationbased waiver should be decided by the arbitral panel.49 The court stated the general
rule that absent clear party intent to the contrary, trial courts and not arbitrators
determine the scope of an arbitration agreement.50 When a court determines the
scope of an arbitration agreement, it applies a presumption favoring arbitration
unless it finds “positive assurance that the arbitration provision is not susceptible
of any interpretation that encompasses the subject matter of the dispute.”51 Because
the court determined that the plain language of the arbitration clause in Great
American’s UM/UIM endorsement was expressly of limited scope, it decided that
the defense of litigation-based waiver was outside the scope of the arbitral

47

Id.
Id.
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Id. at 693-94 n.3 (citing Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 217-19 (3d.
Cir. 2007) (explaining that a litigation-based waiver defense arises when one party argues
that the opposing party has waived its right to arbitrate by actively litigating the case in
court)).
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agreement.52 The arbitration agreement expressly stated that it only applied to
“disputes over entitlement to or recoverable amount of UM/UIM damages.”53 A
litigation-based waiver defense, however, is a procedural defense that is unrelated
to the issue of entitlement to or amount of damages.54 Accordingly, the court
concluded that it found “positive assurance that the arbitration provision is not
susceptible of any interpretation that encompasses a defense of litigation-based
waiver,” and that the arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction to determine this
defense.55
In arriving at this determination, the court explained the policy rationale
behind the presumption that trial courts, and not arbitrators, decide the claims of
litigation-based waiver.56 Trial courts are better-suited to decide these claims than
arbitrators because litigation-based waiver defenses depend upon parties’ conduct
before the trial court and “implicates trial court procedures with which arbitrators
may have less familiarity.”57 Accordingly, the trial courts are in a better position to
decide whether a request for arbitration after litigation is just an attempt at forum
shopping.58 Further, it is inefficient to send a waiver claim to an arbitrator because
if the arbitral panel decides that a party waived its right to arbitrate, it will send the
proceedings back to the trial court “without having made any progress with respect
to the merits of the dispute.”59 Finally, litigation-based waiver is a procedural
question that is wholly unrelated to the merits of the dispute, which the parties
intended to be decided by an arbitrator.60 If parties intend for a litigation-based
waiver claim to be decided by the arbitrator, they could expressly provide for this

52
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in the contract.61 Absent express language to the contrary, however, the court
followed the presumption that the trial court and not the arbitrator must determine
the validity of the defense.62
The court further acknowledged that its holding on this matter was
consistent with other jurisdictions which have held that litigation-based waiver
defenses are properly determined by trial courts.63 Additionally, its decision still
followed the precedent set by the Supreme Court of the United States in Howsam
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.64 Federal and state courts both before and after
Howsam have found that litigation-based waiver defenses were properly
determined by trial courts.65
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE
This case is significant because it reaffirms the strong public policy in

favor of arbitration.66 The court specifically stated that its holding “is supported by
Colorado’s public policy favoring arbitration as a mechanism of alternative dispute
resolution.”67 National Union attempted to argue that a boilerplate statement found
at the end of its endorsement constituted a waiver of the arbitration clause in Great
American’s policy.68 The court, however, found this statement to be ambiguous
and articulated the rule that ambiguous statements should be construed in favor of
61

Radil, 233 P.3d at 695.
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(reasoning that the Howsam holding only referred to “waiver, delay, or like defenses
arising from non-compliance with contractual conditions precedent to arbitration” and did
not upset the “traditional rule that courts, not arbitrators” should decide the validity of
litigation-based waiver defenses)).
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arbitration.69 With this reasoning, the court attempted to indicate its preference for
the resolution of disputes in arbitral proceedings rather than in the courts.
Arbitration is a quicker way to achieve a final, binding solution to disputes than are
court proceedings. Further, while decisions of a trial court can be, and oftentimes
are, overturned by a higher court, decisions of an arbitral panel are given much
more finality and will only be overturned by the courts in rare cases under the
statutory or common law grounds for vacatur.70 Accordingly, courts prefer
arbitration to free the court system of the time-consuming trials and inevitable
appeals that arise when parties attempt to resolve their disputes in court. The
Supreme Court of Colorado deemed arbitration to be a sufficient method for
dispute resolution, and articulated that the strong state policy in favor of arbitration
should prevent courts from removing a case from arbitration just because one party
argued that an ambiguous statement constituted a waiver of the arbitral clause.
The decision also informs parties that if they want to avoid an arbitration
agreement, they must explicitly provide for the exclusion of arbitration within the
contractual agreement.71 The United States Supreme Court has held that arbitration
is a matter of contract, not coercion.72 Accordingly, courts cannot force parties to
arbitrate when the parties’ agreement does not contain an arbitral clause.73 Parties
are free to make valid agreements through contract and can choose whether or not
to include the recourse to arbitration as a method for dispute resolution in those
agreements. If, however, one party endorses an agreement which contains an
arbitral clause, that party will be bound by that arbitral clause unless it explicitly
69

Id.
Under FAA §10, vacatur will only be ordered if the arbitrators are corrupt, exceed their
powers, or ignore the parties’ fundamental rights or the material terms of the arbitration
agreement. The three common law grounds that supplement these statutory grounds for
vacatur of an arbitral award are an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law, an arbitrary
and capricious arbitral award, or an arbitral award that violates public policy. See THOMAS
E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 230 (Thomson/West 2007).
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rejects it. When endorsing Great American’s policy, National Union could have
specifically contracted around the arbitral clause by providing a waiver of the right
to arbitration. Because National Union did not explicitly waive the arbitral clause,
but endorsed the arbitral clause as it stood in Great American’s policy, it was
bound by the terms and conditions within that clause. Through this ruling, the
court affirmed the presumption in favor of arbitration and informed future followform endorsers to be aware of the terms and conditions of the policy they are
endorsing. If they endorse a policy that contains an arbitral clause, they will be
bound by that clause and compelled to arbitrate their disputes unless they take the
affirmative steps to explicitly contract around the arbitral clause.

